New | Contents | Home | OGU Home
The use of radiowave spectrum is managed in two steps: allocation and assignment. Allocation specifies for what purposes a band of spectrum is used, and assignment specifies who is entitled to use each block of a spectrum band. For efficient use of spectrum, it is necessary to adjust allocation and assignment from time to time. Yet, because of vested interests of incumbent users, it is difficult to do this under command and control by a national government or through negotiations in ITU.
The objective of this paper is to propose a mechanism for adjusting allocation, as distinct from assignment, by means of insurance, compensation, and supply-price revelation; in short, it is a price mechanism for spectrum reallocation. The mechanism can reallocate spectrum in such a way that the band currently used with the lowest efficiency is released for a new use with higher efficiency; the users of the reallocated band are compensated properly.
The proposed mechanism can work with various assignment systems, including market-oriented systems, command-and-control assignment, and systems in commons mode. The paper proposes a way in which end users (consumers) are compensated when spectrum-dependent services (such as mobile telephony) are terminated because of reallocation. Further, the paper considers a way to extend the proposed mechanism to international spectrum allocation.
radio spectrum, frequencies, reallocation, international reallocation, insurance and compensation, price mechanism
Osaka-Gakuin Review of Economics: [PDF: 429KB] [DOC: 458KB] (5/8/2008)
Revised (typo only): [PDF: 229KB] [DOC: 457KB] (1/28/2008)
Presented at TPRC: [PDF: 491KB] [DOC: 493KB] (10/2/2004)
Revised (typo only): [PDF: 175KB] [PPT: 487KB] (7/5/2007)
The 32nd Research Conference on Communication, Informationand Internet Policy (TPRC2004)
Paper by Oniki (identical with the full text above)
Back to Pub List Index | Back to Pub List Index (Japanese)
Top of Page | New | Contents | Home | OGU Home
Hajime Oniki