

"Allocation and Assignment of Radio-Spectrum Resources by using Price Mechanism: Proposals for a New System"

WORKSHOP on Advanced Wireless Technologies: Implications for Spectrum Management European Commission, DG Information Society, IST Program Brussels, 10/10/2003 Hajime ONIKI Osaka-Gakuin University, Japan oniki@alum.mit.edu www.osaka-gu.ac.jp/php/oniki/

Contents:

- I. Introduction and Background
- **II.** Present System of Spectrum Utilization
- **III. Provision for Spectrum Commons as a Public Good**
- IV. Re-allocation of Spectrum Bands with Compensation -----An Insurance-Compensation System with Proper Incentives
- V. Re-assignment of Spectrum Blocks ----- Modified Lease Auction (MLA)



Contents:

VI. Gradual Transition to MLA

VII.Conclusion



H. Oniki

10/10/2003

4

3

I. Introduction and Background

A. History of spectrum use: technological progress

B. Administration of spectrum resources

C. Emergence of spectrum shortage



A. History of spectrum use: technological progress

1. Early 20-th century used for maritime navigation navy operations

2. 1920's voice-radio broadcasting 3. 1930-40's

military use, radars

recomfCom

H. Oniki

10/10/2003

6

5

A. History of spectrum use: technological progress

4. 1950's television broadcasting, FM radio

5. 1960's ~ present

many applications including mobile telephony,

wireless Internet, etc.



B. Administration of spectrum resources

- 1. Command and control by country government ("socialist system")
 - a. introduction of new technology to expand the frontier of spectrum use
 - b. assignment of new spectrum blocks to users with zero usage price
 - c. prevention of interferences

JEc Inf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003

B. Administration of spectrum resources

- 2. Allocation and assignment of spectrum
 - a. spectrum allocation by

international organizations (ITU, EC)

country government

b. spectrum assignment (licensing) by country government zero price to users



7

- **C. Emergence of spectrum shortage**
- 1. End of spectrum-frontier expansion no more spectrum band of "good quality" upper limit: 3-5 GHz

JE c Juf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003
		10
C. Emergence	e of spectrum shorta	nge
2. Attempts to spectrum bloc	o use price mechanis cks	m in assigning
	censing on auctions (000 for G3, etc.)	(US: 1993 ~ ,
	um usage fees	



C. Emergence of spectrum shortage

2. Attempts to use price mechanism in assigning spectrum blocks

c. problems:

spectrum "bubbles" (high price) spectrum may become a private property spectrum fees may be only nominal

JEc Inf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003
		12
C. Emergence	e of spectrum shortag	ge

3. Attempts to re-allocate/re-assign spectrum bands

a. international negotiations

 b. re-allocation by country government Japan (2003 ~ for wireless LAN) by command and control



- **C.** Emergence of spectrum shortage
- 3. Attempts to re-allocate/re-assign spectrum bands
 - c. problems:

slow and costly negotiations creates risk and uncertainty to incumbents generates regulatory complexities extreme inefficiencies continue to remain

JEc Inf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003
		14

- **C.** Emergence of spectrum shortage
 - 4. Emergence of new technologies
 - a. possibility of "spectrum commons" spread spectrum, underlay, UWB, software radio



C. Emergence of spectrum shortage

4. Emergence of new technologies

- b. observation: significant increase in spectrum capacity new technologies are created for using "unlicensed bands"
 - proposals of open use to replace

licensing ("commons" campaign)

JEc Inf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003

16

II. Present System of Spectrum Utilization

- A. Spectrum as an economic resource
- **B.** Allocation of spectrum bands (ALLOC)
- **C.** Assignment of spectrum blocks (ASSGN)
- **D.** The challenge in the age of spectrum shortage



A. Spectrum as an economic resource

- 1. One of space resources
 - a. physical spaces: land, water surface, aviation space, satellite orbits, etc.
 - b. electromagnetic spaces: radio spectrum, optical spectrum.

JE c Inf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003
		18

A. Spectrum as an economic resource

- 2. Non-reproducible natural resource
 - a. does not deplete

(unlike mineral, oil deposits)

b. does not depreciate

(unlike machines, equipment)



17

H. Oniki

A. Spectrum as an economic resource

- 3. Physical capacity limit boundary and size
- 4. Technology and capital for using spectrum
 - a. technological progress leads to capacity increase
 - b. substitution between capital and spectrum size

JEcInf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003

20

A. Spectrum as an economic resource

- 5. Modes of utilization
 - a. Exclusive use
 - b. Club use
 - c. Commons use



- A. Spectrum as an economic resource
 - 6. Positive externalities scale economy
 - 7. Negative externalities interferences, congestions
 - 8. Illustration <Figure 1>

EcInfCom

H. Oniki

10/10/2003

22

B. Allocation of spectrum bands (ALLOC)

1. Outline

a. *zoning* of spectrum

b. two-level system:

country and international

c. no price mechanism is used command and control direct negotiations



2. Items to be specified

- a. objective
- **b.** priority
- c. usage mode exclusive, club, commons (unlicensed, open use)
- d. technical items

EcInfCom	H. Oniki	10/10/2003

B. Allocation of spectrum bands (ALLOC)

- 3. Two-level specification
 - a. international level negotiations in ITU, EC
 - b. country level command and control (beauty contest)



4. Re-allocation

a. by international negotiations

b. with insurance-compensation system* (IV)

JEc Juf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003
		26
B. Allocation	n of spectrum bands ((ALLOC)
	difficulties in re-all tional negotiations ar	

- **b.** negotiation with incumbents are difficult
- 6. Illustration <Figure 2>



1. Outline

- a. specification of actual user(s) of spectrum blocks licensing
- b. executed by country government

FecInt Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003
		28
C. Assignm	ent of spectrum block	s (ASSGN)
2. Items to b	e specified to users	

- a. spectrum blocks
- **b.** duration of license
- c. priority, time of use
- d. emission power, technical items



3. Exclusive use----alternative systems for ASSGN

a. Traditional system assignment by country government comparative hearings (beauty contest) lotteries zero or nominal rent automatic (or likely) renewal of license at expiration

JEc Juf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003
C Assignme	nt of spectrum block	30 s (ASSGN)

b. Private-property (or semi-private property) system

assignment with auction competitive price paid in one installment automatic (or likely) renewal



- C. Assignment of spectrum blocks (ASSGN)
- 3. Exclusive use----alternative systems for ASSGN c. Competitive lease system *(V.) assignment by country government with auction on lease price competitive lease price paid re-assignment with auction at expiration no automatic renewal modifications in favor of incumbents



H. Oniki

10/10/2003

32

C. Assignment of spectrum blocks (ASSGN)

4. Club use

- a. Traditional system licensing by country government unlimited entry zero or nominal rent automatic renewal examples: amateur wireless, navigation, aviation
- b. *privatized* club use *(III.)



5. Commons----open use

a. traditional system no licensing power limit

b. commons as a public good *(III.)

H. Oniki

10/10/2003

34

C. Assignment of spectrum blocks (ASSGN)

6. Problems


a. Exclusive use under traditional system low-efficiency uses continue to remain new entry is difficult competition is precluded no incentive to save spectrum low incentive for technological progress



10/10/2003

6. Problems

b. Exclusive use under private-property system
"spectrum hold-up" may occur



C. Assignment of spectrum blocks (ASSGN)

6. Problems

 c. Club use under traditional system congestion may occur re-assignment (re-allocation) is difficult because of the involvement by many users



6. Problems

- d. Commons under traditional system
 re-assignment (re-allocation) is difficult
 because of the involvement by many users
- 7. Illustration <Figure 2>

PEc Inf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003

38

37

D. The challenge in the age of spectrum shortage

1. Present state

incumbent users with vested interests

free and continuing use

2. Need for re-allocation

emergence of new objectives for spectrum use



D. The challenge in the age of spectrum shortage

- 3. Need for re-assignment new users, new business
- 4. Need for accommodating new technologies for spectrum sharing
- 5. The challenge gradual but steady improvement

JEc.InfCom	H. Oniki	10/10/2003

40

39

III. Provision for Spectrum Commons as a Public Good (A Proposal)

A. Outline

B. Proposals *



1. Technology for spectrum sharing

- a. to increase efficiency and flexibility by sharing a spectrum block with many users
- b. new technology SS, CDMA, underlay, UWB

Ec Inf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003

42

A. Outline

- **1.** Technology for spectrum sharing
 - c. *old technology* amateur wireless, navigation use, aviation use
 - d. commons for using land space public parks, street roads, town commons



- 2. Outcome from using commons:
 - a. depends on demand (number of users) and supply (capacity of spectrum block)
 - b. efficient use with *ample capacity*
 - c. congestion with *capacity shortage*
 - d. outcome may change in the long run from free use to congestion

reconf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003

44

43

A. Outline

3. Observation

a. spectrum sharing under direct governmental control (Mode-G) commons: ISM clubs: navigation and aviation, outdoor wireless-LAN



3. Observation

b. Spectrum sharing under private

licensee's control (Mode-L)

commons:

free broadcast to viewers

clubs: mobile telephony, pay-per-view broadcast



H. Oniki

10/10/2003

46

A. Outline

3. Observation

c. mode-G commons may lead to congestion and inefficient use, but re-allocation is difficult need for creating a system with easy re-allocation



1. Preference of Mode-L to Mode-G for spectrum sharing

a. strong incentives for efficient use

b. convenience for re-allocation and re-assignment

JEc Inf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003

48

47

B. Proposals*

2. Mode-L spectrum sharing

- a. assign spectrum blocks exclusively to private licensees
- **b.** let the licensees supply spectrum blocks to end users in club or commons
- c. examples outdoor wireless LAN



B. Proposals*

a. establish a *public agent* to administer Mode-G spectrum clubs or commons

to avoid formation of unlimited rights

of using spectrum

JEc Inf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003

50

B. Proposals*

- **3. Mode-G spectrum sharing (spectrum as a** *public good*)
 - b. let the *public agent* supply spectrum blocks to end users in clubs or commons the cost for the agent to secure the blocks may be paid from government budget (along with paying for other public goods) (V.)



B. Proposals*

 b. let the public agent supply spectrum blocks to end users in clubs or commons the agent administers insurancecompensation for re-allocation* (IV.) Mode-G commons become a *public good*

recInfCom	H. Oniki	10/10/2003

B. Proposals*

3.Mode-G spectrum sharing (spectrum as a public good)

- c. examples (over direct termination of license): ISM, indoor wireless LAN
- d. advantages:

reveal the opportunity cost of spectrum bands/blocks supplied as a public good create a representative of users' interests re-allocation, re-assignment will be easier

H. Oniki



52

B. Proposals*

- 3. Mode-G spectrum sharing (spectrum as a public good)
- e. observation on Mode-G commons would be the same as present-day unlicensed blocks if operated under government command and control would become a free good if spectrum capacity exceeds demand because of technological progress but otherwise would turn to a public goods

JEc Inf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003
		54

B. Proposals*

4. Illustration <Figure 3>



IV. Re-allocation of Spectrum Bands with Compensation -----An Insurance-Compensation System with Proper Incentives

A. Outline

- **B.** Insurance-compensation system for reallocation within a country* (a proposal)
- C. International insurance-compensation system for spectrum re-allocation* (a proposal)

JEc Inf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003
		56

A. Outline

- 1. Re-allocation of spectrum bands
 - a. need arises from technological progress and changes in demand
 - b. shortage of spectrum bands to meet new demand
 - c. shortage is a global (frequency-wise) problem over all spectrum bands



- **1. Re-allocation of spectrum bands**
 - d. re-allocation is to be made locally with a single band
 - e. a band to be re-allocated is a "sacrifice" for the benefit of other users
 - f. need for compensation to outgoing users at re-allocation, the cost should be paid by all

users

JEc Juf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003

58

A. Outline

2. Compensation

a. acceptable compensation

the least amount of money for which a spectrum user to accept termination of using a block; the user moves from current activity X to new activity Y accordingly.



2. Compensation

b. determination:

(acceptable compensation)

= (present value of activity X)

- (present value of activity Y) + Q

Q = once-and-for-all cost of moving from **X** to **Y**

JEc Inf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003

60

A. Outline

2. Compensation

c. compensation would be needed regardless of the system of assignment: command and control, property system, competitive lease, Mode-L or Mode-G commons / clubs.



2. Compensation

d. compensation in kind under command and control: part of compensation is made in the form of providing spectrum at some band: acceptable compensation need to be declared for each specification of compensation in kind.
example:

X = 1MHz in the 2GHz band Y = 2MGz in the 15GHz band



H. Oniki

10/10/2003

- **B.** Insurance-compensation system for re-allocation within a country (a proposal)
 - 1. Acceptable compensation and premium
 - a. acceptable compensation to be declared by each spectrum user



B. Insurance-compensation system for re-allocation within a country (a proposal)

- 1. Acceptable compensation and premium
 - annual compensation premium to be paid by each spectrum user annually to spectrum manager (country government)
 - = (declared acceptable compensation) times (premium rate)

JEc Inf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003

64

63

- **B.** Insurance-compensation system for re-allocation within a country (a proposal)
 - 2. Premium rate and government budget
 - a. premium rate

to be determined by spectrum manager so that the total annual income from the compensation premiums be equal to the total annual compensations paid for the re-allocation in the year.



B. Insurance-compensation system for re-allocation within a country (a proposal)

2. Premium rate and government budget

b. implications

 actuarially fair insurance
 balanced budget for spectrum re-allocation

JE c Inf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003
		66

- **B.** Insurance-compensation system for re-allocation within a country (a proposal)
 - **3. Determination of spectrum bands to be re-allocated**
- a. indicator of efficiency increase from re-allocating a band: = (B - C) / A, where A = (present value of using the band under old objective)
 B = (present value of using the band under new objective)
 C = (amount of compensation for the re-allocation)



- **B.** Insurance-compensation system for re-allocation within a country (a proposal)
 - **3. Determination of spectrum bands to be re-allocated**
 - b. maximum efficiency indicator the band with the highest efficiency indicator (which exceeds 1) is to be chosen for re-allocation an incentive for honest declaration of acceptable compensation by users

JEC Juf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003
		68
	compensation system on within a country	

- 4. Determination of data A and B for re-allocation
 - a. under command and control country government needs to estimate both A and B



- **B.** Insurance-compensation system for re-allocation within a country (a proposal)
 - 4. Determination of data A and B for re-allocation
 - b. under property system
 A and B may be obtained from appropriate market transactions if such take place, otherwise country government needs to estimate them.

JEc Inf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003
B. Insurance-c	compensation system	70 1 for

- **B.** Insurance-compensation system for re-allocation within a country (a proposal)
- 4. Determination of data A and B for re-allocation
- c. under competitive lease

A can be calculated from current lease price, B can be calculated if there is a block being used for the new objective, otherwise it need to be estimated.



B. Insurance-compensation system for re-allocation within a country (a proposal)

5. Illustration <Figure 4>

JEc Inf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003		
		72		
C. International insurance-compensation system for spectrum re-allocation (a proposal)				
1		P 05 a 1)		
1. Group of	country governments for e-compensation system (C	r international		
1. Group of insurance	country governments for	r international GIIC)		
1. Group of insurance	country governments for e-compensation system (C rmed voluntarily by coun	r international GIIC)		
1. Group of insurance a. to be for b. objectiv	country governments for e-compensation system (C rmed voluntarily by coun	r international GIIC) try governments		
1. Group of insurance a. to be for b. objectiv to ad	country governments for e-compensation system (C cmed voluntarily by coun	r international GIIC) try governments surance-		

bands via compensation



- C. International insurance-compensation system for spectrum re-allocation (a proposal)
 - 2. Acceptable compensation and premium
 - a. to be declared by each member country for each band
 - b. annual compensation premium to be paid by each member country annually to GIIC
 - = (declared acceptable compensation) times (premium rate).

H. Oniki

10/10/2003

- **C.** International insurance-compensation system for spectrum re-allocation (a proposal)
 - **3.** Premium rate and determination/recommendation of spectrum bands to be re-allocated internationally
 - a. premium rate to be determined by GIIC so as to balance its annual budget
 - b. indicator of efficiency increase from re-allocating a band internationally (same as in V.B.3.a)



- C. International insurance-compensation system for spectrum re-allocation (a proposal)
 - **3.** Premium rate and determination/recommendation of spectrum bands to be re-allocated internationally
 - c. maximum efficiency increase the band with the highest efficiency indicator (which exceeds 1) is to be chosen for re-allocation

JEc Inf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003

76

75

- C. International insurance-compensation system for spectrum re-allocation (a proposal)
 - **3.** Premium rate and determination/recommendation of spectrum bands to be re-allocated internationally
 - d. GIIC

executes or recommends (to ITU, EC) the choice of the band (in c. above) pays compensation to each member country according to re-allocation agreement made in ITU, EU.



- C. International insurance-compensation system for spectrum re-allocation (a proposal)
 - 4. Behavior of a member country of GIIC
 - a. member country with a domestic insurance-compensation system operates with two *accounts*:

JEc Inf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003

- C. International insurance-compensation system for spectrum re-allocation (a proposal)
 - 4. Behavior of a member country of GIIC

with GIIC system:

represents GIIC to domestic users as a (neutral) intermediary

domestic users deal in effect directly with GIIC

decreases incentive for dishonest declaration of acceptable compensation by users



77

- C. International insurance-compensation system for spectrum re-allocation (a proposal)
 - 4. Behavior of a member country of GIIC

with domestic insurance-compensation system for domestic re-allocations: users pay annual premium both to GIIC and domestic government domestic budget will be balanced

recInfCour	H. Oniki	10/10/2003
C Internation	al insurance-compens	80

C. International insurance-compensation system for spectrum re-allocation (a proposal)

4.Behavior of a member country of GIIC

 b. member country without a domestic insurance-compensation system needs to estimate acceptable compensation for each band budget from paying premiums and receiving compensations need not balance



C. International insurance-compensation system for spectrum re-allocation (a proposal)

5. Illustration <Figure 5>



H. Oniki

10/10/2003

82

V. Re-assignment of Spectrum Blocks ----- Modified Lease Auction (MLA)

A. ASSGN by means of (simple) lease auction (LA)

B. Accommodation of various usage modes within the

system of LA



- C. Disadvantages of LA
- D. Protecting incumbents against ROD to an appropriate degree
- E. Further consideration of ROD
- F. Remarks

PEcInf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003

84

- A. ASSGN by means of (simple) lease auction (LA)
 - 1. Spectrum resources owned by government and leased to spectrum users (managers), private or public, by auction; lease to be applied to all users including government users ----- no exception give incentive to save spectrum use



- A. ASSGN by means of (simple) lease auction (LA)
 - 2. Auction for each spectrum block --- frequency range, geographical area, time, priority
 - 3. Resale of licenses ----- permitted within ALLOC and AGGGN specifications

recJufCom	
-----------	--

H. Oniki

10/10/2003

85

86

B. Accommodation of various usage modes within the system of LA

1. Exclusive use:

winner of auction become the user

2. Club use:

winner of auction represent the share

users



B. Accommodation of various usage modes within the system of LA

3. Commons use:

a. type-1 ("unlicensed" use)

winner of auction of primary exclusive right become the manager of the union of, e.g., suppliers of devices using the spectrum; union membership should be open and members pay the lease prices

EcInfCom

H. Oniki

10/10/2003

87

88

B. Accommodation of various usage modes within the system of LA

- 3. Commons use:
 - b. type-2 ("overlay" including UWB)

winner of auction of secondary right

become the manager of the union of

suppliers of devices, etc.



B. Accommodation of various usage modes within the system of LA

4. Government may support commons use government agent may bid and win auction; the lease price is paid by government; an upper limit of lease price is specified prior to auction

1	0.5	1.1	0	
1	201	nf	C	om

H. Oniki

10/10/2003

89

90

C. Disadvantages of LA

1. Risk of lease discontinuation (ROD) to spectrum users

arising from newcomers outbidding incumbents

2. Cost of administering auctions



D. Protecting incumbents against ROD to an appropriate degree

1. Against ROD :

- a. discount of lease price to incumbents
- b. auction to be held years before the beginning of

license period

EcInfCom

H. Oniki

10/10/2003

91

92

D. Protecting incumbents against ROD to an appropriate degree

- 1. Against ROD :
 - c. use of "pre-auction" (winners obtain discount)
 - d. creation of futures and options markets for

leasing spectrum

E. Further consideration of **ROD**

Economic meaning of ROD
 a. the other side of economic growth
 b. a price of having flexibility in spectrum use

c. no ROD in stationary (stagnant) economy



H. Oniki

10/10/2003

94

93

E. Further consideration of ROD

- 2. The degree of ROD
 - a. determines the balance between the security to

incumbents and the chance of entry by newcomers

b. optimum to be found by trials and errors



E. Further consideration of **ROD**

2. The degree of ROD

c. zero: allocation by central planning (assignment

by government with automatic renewals)

low: auction on the right to use spectrum

permanently

medium: MLA

high: LA

EcInfCom

H. Oniki

10/10/2003

96

E. Further consideration of ROD

3. Illustration <Figure 6>



F. Remarks

1. Why not perpetuity (property ownership system) ?
a. presence of externalities (scale economies) in the use of spectrum
b. Coase's theorem does not work because of uncertainty and bargaining time/cost (for Nash equilibrium with different information sets)

JEc Inf Com

H. Oniki

10/10/2003

98

F. Remarks

2. Why not LA? (why are the modifications needed?)

a. with incomplete and costly information, prevalence

of ROD may not be optimal.

b. positive economics for determining "optimal degree

of protection against ROD''?

--- a subject for future research.



VI. Gradual Transition to MLA

A. Overview

B. Transition

C. Income Compensation

D. Forecast

H. Oniki

10/10/2003

100

A. Overview

EcInf Com

- 1. Need for gradual and informed transition
 - a. cost of transition arising from the presence of capital stock and human skills fitted to the old system
 - b. information about the overall transition process is needed for the formation of transition plan by spectrum users



A. Overview

- 2. policies for transition
 - a. formation of "benchmark lease price (BLP), a proxy of market price"

b. gradual increase in usage fees from the current level(=0) to the market price (=BLP)

c. provisions for income compensation

VEcInfCom	H. Oniki	10/10/2003

102

B. Transition

- **1. Preparation period (M years)**
 - a. MLA to be applied to new assignments

zero usage fees to incumbents

b. BLP: to be set at auction prices if available, else to be calculated by interpolation-periodic revisions



B. Transition

2. Execution period (N years)

a. MLA to new assignments

b. partial lease price (PLP), equal to ((n/N)* BLP), to be paid by incumbents in n-th year (n=1,2,...,N); no ROD to incumbents

<i>FecInfCour</i>	H. Oniki	10/10/2003

B. Transition

- **3.** Completion of transition process
 - a. traversing smoothly to full-scale MLA
 - b. all licenses to be issued under MLA with payment of full lease price (FLP) thereafter
 - c. resale of licenses permitted
- 4. Illustration <Figures 7, 8>



C. Income Compensation

1. Overview

a. (possible) compensation to incumbents for the payment of PLP and FLP

b. complete separation of spectrum usage and income distribution

JEc Inf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003

106

C. Income Compensation

- 2. Determination of compensation
 - a. compensation period : t=1,2, ,T;no compensation for t > T
 - b. base amount of payment (BAP): the value of the spectrum held at t=0 evaluated in terms of current PLP or FLP, whichever applied.

H. Oniki



C. Income Compensation

c. the degree of compensation for period t, d(t); 0 d(t) 1 for 0 t T; d(t) = 0 for t > T. d. linear sunset: d(t)=(T-t)/T for 0 t T; d(t) = 0 for t > T.

EcInfCom

H. Oniki

10/10/2003

108

C. Income Compensation

- 3. Policies for compensation:
 - a. government determines g for each user category

near-full compensation: military and security users (g=1)

partial compensation : government users, public utilities, public

transportation operators, welfare agents, etc. (g=0.5)

no compensation : profit-seeking entities, individual users



C. Income Compensation

3. Policies for compensation: b. actual amount of compensation in period t : AAC(t) $AAC(t) = g^*d(t)^*BAP(t),$ $0 \quad AAC(t) \quad BAP(t), \quad t = 1, 2, ..., T.$

110

C. Income Compensation

4. Neutrality

choice of a degree of compensation d(t) does not affect the incentive to save and release spectrum by incumbents



D. Forecast

- 1. increase in lease price in the preparation period because of unbalanced usages still remaining
- 2. gradual decrease in the execution period and afterward because of "leveled" usage
- **3.** lease price will approach to zero in the long run (?) depends technology and demand in the future

JEc Inf Com	H. Oniki	10/10/2003

112

VII. Conclusion

Illustraion < Figure 9>

